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I. INTRODUCTION 
When the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 
1973 on March 17, 2011, the world witnessed a brief moment of legal and 
moral clarity.1 Although at least 17 humanitarian interventions have taken 
place since 1990—including northern and southern Iraq, East Timor, Bos-
nia, Somalia, and Kosovo2—humanitarian intervention has often been hand-
  
  The following was presented at the International Law in Crisis Symposium hosted by 
Case Western Reserve University School of Law on September 8–9, 2011, webcast available 
at http://law.case.edu/centers/cox/webcast.asp?dt=20110909. 
 † Dr. Paul R. Williams is the Rebecca I. Grazier Professor of Law and International Rela-
tions at American University. He is also the co-founder and President of the Public Interna-
tional Law & Policy Group, a global pro bono law firm providing assistance to parties en-
gaged in peace negotiations and drafting post-conflict constitutions. In this capacity, Dr. 
Williams provides pro bono legal assistance to the Libyan Transitional National Council. 
PhD Cambridge, J.D. Stanford Law School, AB UC Davis. 
 ‡ Betsy Popken is a Law Fellow at the Public International Law & Policy Group with 
sponsorship from Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP and provides pro bono legal assistance 
to the Libyan Transitional National Council. J.D. University of Southern California, LLM 
London School of Economics, BA UCLA. 
 1 This moment of legal and moral clarity may have already passed. At the time of writing 
this article, the Syrian government had killed more than 2,900 civilians and the Security 
Council had yet to pass any resolution condemning the violence. See Syria Protests: More 
Than 2,900 Killed Overall, Says UN, BBC NEWS (Oct. 6, 2011) http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
news/world-middle-east-15203188; Joe Lauria, Russia, China Veto U.N.’s Syria Move, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2011, at A9. 
 2 Taylor B. Seybolt, HUMANITARIAN MILITARY INTERVENTION: THE CONDITIONS FOR 
SUCCESS AND FAILURE 28 (2007). 
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icapped by narrow legal mandates and weak implementation. But in Libya, 
the world got it right. The Security Council quickly passed a well-drafted 
legal blueprint for humanitarian intervention and an international coalition3 
aggressively implemented it. In doing so, a coalition led by the British and 
French demonstrated the legal skill and moral commitment to prevent an 
impending massacre.4   
This article argues that Resolution 1973 and its subsequent imple-
mentation provide a blueprint for effective humanitarian intervention.5 The 
humanitarian intervention in Libya was characterized by: (1) swift action by 
the Security Council to authorize military intervention when diplomacy 
appeared fruitless;6 (2) a well-drafted resolution that provided the mandate 
necessary for a successful intervention; and (3) aggressive and immediate 
implementation by an international coalition. This article does not take the 
view that humanitarian intervention is always the appropriate response to 
the international community’s responsibility to protect civilians from atroci-
  
 3 The international coalition that contributed to the operation in Libya included the United 
States, France, Britain, Italy, Canada, Spain, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Belgium, the Neth-
erlands, Bulgaria, Turkey, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan. Simon Rogers, 
NATO Operations in Libya: Data Journalism Breaks Down Which Country Does What, 
GUARDIAN DATABLOG, (Oct. 31, 2011, 7:30 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog 
/2011/may/22/nato-libya-data-journalism-operations-country#data. 
 4 Because the British and French were moral leaders of the humanitarian intervention in 
Libya from the beginning, this article will refer to the international coalition that implement-
ed Resolution 1973 as the “British-French led coalition.” See generally S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). However, the authors of this article do recognize that the 
U.S. played a large role in the redrafting of Resolution 1973 days before it was passed, and 
has committed the largest number of military assets to the campaign. Rogers, supra note 3. 
Some scholars have referred to the U.S.’s participation in the humanitarian intervention as 
“leading from behind.” See generally Simon Chesterman, “Leading from Behind”: The 
Responsibility to Protect, the Obama Doctrine, and Humanitarian Intervention After Libya, 
25 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 279 (2011). 
 5 For one of the first efforts to analyze humanitarian intervention in Libya, see generally 
contributions from the Carnegie roundtable entitled Libya, RtoP, and Humanitarian Interven-
tion, including articles from Alex J. Bellamy, Simon Chesterman, James Pattison, Thomas G. 
Weiss, and Jennifer Welsh, available at http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/journal 
/25_3/roundtable/index.html. For discussion of Libya as the first exercise of the Responsibil-
ity to Protect, see Gareth Evans, UN Targets Libya with Pinpoint Accuracy, NAT’L TIMES 
(Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/politics/un-targets-libya-with-pinpoint-
accuracy-20110323-1c6pc.html#ixzz1aIS0mLtW [hereinafter Pinpoint Accuracy]; Gareth 
Evans, Former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans: Responsibility to Protect, YALEGLOBAL 
ONLINE (Apr. 15, 2011), http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/gareth-evans-responsibility-pro 
tect-transcript [hereinafter Evans on Responsibility to Protect].  
 6 The international coalition was not deceived by repeated calls for a ceasefire from the 
Gadhafi regime, a tactic that has deceived the international community in so many other 
instances where atrocities have been committed against civilians. See Simon Denyer & Leila 
Fadel, NATO Strike Kills Son of Gaddafi, WASH. POST, May 1, 2011, at A1.  
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ties and crimes against humanity.7 However, when the international com-
munity does determine that humanitarian intervention is the right course of 
action, Resolution 1973 and its implementation provides a model frame-
work to successfully protect civilians.  
In Libya, it took less than one month and just one prior resolution 
for the Security Council to authorize the use of force to protect civilians.8 
Less than one month after Muammar Gadhafi first ordered helicopters and 
snipers to kill protesters in Benghazi9 and just nineteen days after measures 
under Security Council Resolution 197010 had failed to stop Gadhafi’s forc-
es advancing towards Benghazi, the Security Council authorized the use of 
force to protect civilians. Resolution 1973 is a well-drafted legal blueprint 
that provides intervening forces with the mandate necessary for a successful 
intervention.11 This legal blueprint authorized: (1) the use of “all necessary 
measures” to enforce the resolution; (2) the protection of all “civilian popu-
  
 7 The intervention in Libya is widely recognized as the first exercise by members of the 
international community of the full spectrum of measures available under the Responsibility 
to Protect. The Responsibility to Protect developed as a result of several humanitarian crises 
in the 1990s, and in response to the debate regarding the legality of humanitarian interven-
tion. The primary dilemma addressed by the doctrine is how to balance a state’s sovereign 
right to conduct its affairs with the international community’s responsibility to protect civil-
ians. The Responsibility to Protect encompasses three Pillars: (1) states’ responsibility to 
protect their own citizens; (2) the international community’s responsibility to aid states in 
protecting their citizens; and (3) timely and decisive action by the international community if 
states manifestly fail to do so. The third pillar encompasses a variety of measures which may 
be peaceful—such as fact-finding or mediation, coercive—such as sanctions or embargos, or 
forceful—such as military intervention. Humanitarian intervention under Pillar 3 is consid-
ered a last resort, when other peaceful or coercive measures have failed or would prove inad-
equate. In Libya, when more diplomatic and other non-violent measures failed to yield re-
sults, the British-French led coalition did not hesitate to intervene militarily to protect Libyan 
civilians. For discussion of Libya as the first exercise of the Responsibility to Protect, see 
Pinpoint Accuracy, supra note 5; Evans on Responsibility to Protect, supra note 5. The au-
thors recognize that some scholars address the military action in Libya as humanitarian inter-
vention while others address it as the responsibility to protect. The distinction between hu-
manitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect is unimportant for the purposes of 
this article, which will refer to military action in Libya as humanitarian intervention.  
 8 See Timeline: Libya’s Gaddafi Killed as His Hometown Taken, REUTERS (Oct. 22, 
2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/22/us-libya-events-idUSTRE79L17J201110 
22 (providing a timeline of the conflict in Libya). 
 9 Nick Meo, Libya Protests: 140 ‘Massacred’ as Gaddafi Sends in Snipers to Crush 
Dissent, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 20, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaand 
indianocean/libya/8335934/Libya-protests-140-massacred-as-Gaddafi-sends-in-snipers-to-
crush-dissent.html. 
 10 Security Council Resolution 1970 included an asset freeze, arms embargo, travel ban, 
and referral to the International Criminal Court (ICC). S.C. Res. 1970, ¶¶ 1–23, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011). 
 11 Other scholars agree that Resolution 1973 is a well-drafted resolution. See Pinpoint 
Accuracy, supra note 5. 
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lated areas . . . including Benghazi”; (3) the protection of areas “under threat 
of attack”; (4) an exception to the arms embargo “notwithstanding para-
graph 9 of resolution 1970”; (5) an exclusion of a “foreign occupation 
force” that still allowed for limited presence on the ground; and (6) a no fly 
zone with teeth.12 A coalition led by the British and French immediately and 
aggressively implemented the mandate under Resolution 1973. Just two 
days after Resolution 1973 was adopted, French planes attacked Gadhafi’s 
forces advancing on Benghazi, and the U.S. and U.K. launched over 110 
cruise missiles into Libya.13 On March 31, NATO assumed full responsibil-
ity for the mission in Libya, and conducted over 9,000 strike sorties in six 
months.14  
Humanitarian intervention in Libya was characterized by recogni-
tion by the international community that this was not a war between two 
moral equals.15 This recognition was reflected throughout Resolution 1973, 
particularly in the cleverly drafted clause extending protection to civilian 
populated areas including Benghazi and in the exception to the arms embar-
go.16 This notion was also apparent in the firm manner in which the interna-
tional coalition implemented the resolution to protect persons under threat 
of attack by Gadhafi’s forces.17 
Rarely has the Security Council responded so quickly and effective-
ly to stop a humanitarian crisis. In Bosnia, for instance, over a year passed 
from the time Serbian forces first fired on peaceful demonstrators in Saraje-
vo until the Security Council authorized the use of force to deter attacks 
against safe areas.18 And, by the time the Dayton Peace Accords were 
  
 12 S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 4, ¶¶ 4–12. 
 13 See Libya: US, UK and France Attack Gaddafi Forces, BBC NEWS (Mar. 20, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12796972. 
 14 Strike sorties are intended to identify and engage appropriate targets, but do not neces-
sarily deploy munitions each time. Press Release, NATO, NATO and Libya: Operational 
Media Update, Sept. 29, 2011, available at http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_ 
2011_09/20110930_110930-oup-update.pdf. 
 15 See Garth Evans, Viewpoint: ‘Overwhelming’ Moral Case for Military Path, BBC 
NEWS (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12676248 (arguing that there 
is a strong moral justification for the West intervening in Libya to protect civilians); Steve 
Clemons, Viewpoint: Libya Intervention ‘Brings Huge Risks,’ BBC NEWS (Mar. 12, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12708727 (arguing that the western nations are in 
danger of losing their moral status by intervening and becoming crusaders). 
 16 S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 4, ¶ 4. Some scholars look unfavorably upon the partiality 
showed by the Security Council in this resolution. See Jennifer Welsh, Civilian Protection in 
Libya: Putting Coercion and Controversy Back into RtoP, 25 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 1, 4–6 
(2011). 
 17 See S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 4, ¶ 4 (indicating the strength with which the interna-
tional community responded to this issue by authorizing all necessary measures to protect 
civilians). 
 18 S.C. Res. 836, ¶¶ 5, 9–10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/836 (June 4, 1993). 
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signed nearly four years later, thirty-three separate resolutions provided 
piecemeal legal authorization for intervention in Bosnia,19 and between 
around one hundred thousand civilians were killed and over two million 
displaced.20 Despite Security Council authorization to use force in Bosnia, 
the international community was timid and tardy in the implementation of 
military intervention. In fact, General Michael Rose, who led the U.N. mis-
sion in Bosnia, specifically said that the U.N. “must . . . avoid all situations 
that involve the use of force . . . . It is not part of our mission to impose any 
solution through force of arms.”21 As a result, NATO forces and U.N. 
peacekeepers turned a blind eye to numerous attacks by Serbian forces on 
civilians in designated safe areas, and when NATO did use force, it was 
characterized by pinprick airstrikes on unmanned tanks22 and airport run-
ways.23  
Unlike Libya, the humanitarian intervention in Bosnia was blinded 
by a notion that both sides should be treated equally. This was reflected 
throughout the campaign in the slow authorization for the use of force, the 
lack of response to violations by the Serbian troops, and the duration of a 
two-sided arms embargo.24 In one particularly egregious instance, U.N. 
forces destroyed the bunkers and trenches of Bosnian government troops 
and drove over 550 of them at gunpoint from a strategic area in order to 
“preempt the Serbs from doing it themselves.”25  
  
 19 Between April 7, 1992 and December 14, 1995, the Security Council passed thirty-three 
resolutions, beginning with U.N. Security Council Resolution 749 (1992) and ending with 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1016 (1995). S.C. Res. 749, U.N. Doc. S/RES/749 (Apr. 7, 
1992); S.C. Res. 1016, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1016 (Sept. 21, 1995). 
 20 Bosnia War Dead Figure Announced, BBC NEWS (June 21, 2007), http://news.bbc.co. 
uk/2/hi/europe/6228152.stm; U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES [UNHCR], UNHCR 
GLOBAL APPEAL 224 (Ann Encontre et al. eds., 2004), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=3fc754793&query=2.2%20million%20
bosnia. 
 21 BALKAN WATCH (Action Council for Peace in the Balkans, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 24, 
1994, available at http://publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011 
/09/Vol.-1-Issue-7-Oct.-24-19941.pdf. 
 22 BALKAN WATCH (Action Council for Peace in the Balkans, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 26, 
1994, available at http://publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011 
/09/Vol.-1-Issue-3-Sept.-26-19942.pdf. 
 23 BALKAN WATCH (Action Council for Peace in the Balkans, Washington, D.C.), Nov. 28, 
1994, available at http://publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011 
/09/Vol.-1-Issue-12-Nov.-28-19941.pdf.  
 24 See Richard K. Betts, The Delusion of Impartial Intervention, 73 FOREIGN AFF. 20, 24–
25 (1994) (explaining the danger of impartiality in Bosnia and the negative consequences 
that stemmed from it). 
 25 BALKAN WATCH (Action Council for Peace in the Balkans, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 11, 
1994, available at http://publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011 
/09/Vol.-1-Issue-5-Oct.-11-19941.pdf. 
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Often, in the face of ongoing atrocities, the Security Council fails to 
authorize intervention.26 This was the case in Kosovo, where over a year 
after attacks by Serbian forces on ethnic Albanians and a massacre of the 
Jashari family in the village of Prekaz,27 the Security Council had adopted 
only two resolutions,28 neither of which authorized the use of force. Eventu-
ally, NATO airstrikes began without Security Council approval. And later, 
the international community refused to admit the legality of intervention, 
instead dubbing it “illegal but legitimate.”29  
Tragically, sometimes the international community does nothing at 
all. In 1994, the world watched in silence while over eight hundred thou-
sand were killed in the Rwandan genocide.30 The genocide in Darfur has 
claimed over four hundred thousand lives,31 and despite strong rhetoric con-
demning the attacks against civilians, the international community’s re-
sponse to the atrocities has been wholly inadequate to protect them.32 
Despite these and other lessons, humanitarian intervention in Libya 
did not have the full support of the international community every step of 
the way. In the adoption of Resolution 1973, five countries abstained: Ger-
many, Russia, China, India, and Brazil.33 Germany was concerned that there 
would be large-scale loss of life and that implementation of Resolution 1973 
would result in “protracted military conflict.”34 Brazil believed that humani-
tarian intervention would exacerbate the situation in Libya, “causing more 
harm than good to . . . civilians,”35 and Russia warned against “unpredicted 
consequences” and expressed concern about who would enforce the 
measures and how they would enforce them.36 India was similarly con-
  
 26 See generally George A. Critchlow, Stopping Genocide Through International Agree-
ment When the Security Council Fails to Act, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 311 (2008) (discussing the 
failures of the Security Council to act and the reasons why). 
 27 See Balkans Special Report, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/ 
longterm/balkans/timekosovo4.htm (last visited Feb. 29, 2012).  
 28 See S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 (Sept. 23, 1998); S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1203 (Oct. 24, 1998). 
 29 INDEP. INT’L COMM’N ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT (2000), available at http://site 
maker.umich.edu/drwcasebook/files/the_kosovo_report_and_update.pdf. 
 30 Genocide in Rwanda, UNITED HUM. RTS. COUNCIL, http://www.unitedhumanrights.org/ 
genocide/genocide_in_rwanda.htm (last visited Feb. 29, 2012). 
 31 Genocide in Darfur, UNITED HUM. RTS. COUNCIL, http://www.unitedhumanrights.org/ 
genocide/genocide-in-sudan.htm (last visited Feb. 29, 2012). 
 32 TAYLOR B. SEYBOLT, HUMANITARIAN MILITARY INTERVENTION: THE CONDITIONS FOR 
SUCCESS AND FAILURE 1 (2007). 
 33 U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6498th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6498 (Mar. 17, 2011). 
 34 Id. at 4–5. 
 35 Id. at 6. 
 36 Id. at 8. 
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cerned about implementation and unintended consequences,37 while China 
simply disagreed with a resolution that authorized force when peaceful 
means had not been exhausted.38  
Once Resolution 1973 was adopted and humanitarian intervention 
underway, certain members of the international community continued to 
doubt the wisdom of intervention. Although Arab League calls for a no fly 
zone in Libya played a role in the adoption of Resolution 1973,39 and Leba-
non reportedly played a role in its drafting,40 Arab League leaders balked 
once they saw what actions were actually required for a successful humani-
tarian intervention.41 Even amongst some NATO allies, resolve began to 
falter as the campaign proved to be longer than some had anticipated.42  
Fortunately, the fears espoused by the five abstainers proved largely 
unfounded. Likely far fewer civilians died in the implementation of Resolu-
tion 1973 than would have been killed if the world had done nothing. Fears 
about who would implement the campaign were quickly quashed as the 
British, French, and Americans immediately took the lead, followed shortly 
thereafter by NATO. And while the campaign was perhaps not as brief as 
some would have preferred, it began to wind down after just six months. 
Lastly—and not to be underestimated—the Libyan people are now free 
from a brutal dictator and able to determine their own future. 
This article argues that Resolution 1973 and its subsequent imple-
mentation provide a blueprint for humanitarian intervention that successful-
ly protects civilians. In order to shed light on this framework for interven-
tion, this article: (1) analyzes the text of Resolution 1973 authorizing the use 
of force; and (2) examines the interpretation and implementation of Resolu-
tion 1973 by the international coalition. In the analysis of Resolution 1973, 
this article focuses on paragraph 4 of the resolution, under the heading “Pro-
tection of Civilians,”43 and paragraphs 6 and 8 of the resolution, under the 
heading “No Fly Zone.”44 
  
 37 Id. at 5–6. 
 38 Id. at 10. 
 39 Richard Leiby & Muhammad Mansour, Arab League Endorses No-Fly Zone Over Lib-
ya, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2011, at A1. 
 40 Libya: UN Backs Action Against Colonel Gaddafi, BBC NEWS (Mar. 18, 2011), http:// 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12781009. 
 41 Edward Cody, Arab Group Decries West’s Broad Air Campaign in Libya, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 21, 2011, at A13.  
 42 One such example is Italy’s Foreign Minister, Franco Frattini’s call for a ceasefire. See 
Matt Robinson, Italy Ceasefire Call Exposes NATO Split on Libya, REUTERS (June 22, 2011), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/22/us-libya-idUSTRE7270JP20110622. 
 43 S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 4, ¶ 4.  
Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nation-
ally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation 
with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding para-
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Where relevant, this article will compare the text of Resolution 
1973 with an earlier, leaked draft of the resolution. The first draft of the 
resolution was prepared primarily by the British and French with input from 
Lebanon.45 Reportedly, between the leaked version of the resolution and 
adoption of Resolution 1973, the Americans engaged,46 and presumably 
contributed to broadening the resolution. This Article will compare and con-
trast paragraph 4 of Resolution 1973 with paragraph 10 of the draft resolu-
tion, entitled “Civilian Protection and Humanitarian Assistance Authoriza-
tion.”47 Paragraph 4 of Resolution 1973 is significantly broader than para-
  
graph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas 
under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while 
excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory, 
and requests the Member States concerned to inform the Secretary-General imme-
diately of the measures they take pursuant to the authorization conferred by this 
paragraph which shall be immediately reported to the Security Council . . . . 
Id. 
 44 Id. ¶¶ 6, 8. 
Decides to establish a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya in order to help protect civilians . . . . 
Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General and the Secre-
tary-General of the League of Arab States, acting nationally or through regional 
organizations or arrangements, to take all necessary measures to enforce compli-
ance with the ban on flights imposed by paragraph 6 above, as necessary, and re-
quests the States concerned in cooperation with the League of Arab States to coor-
dinate closely with the Secretary General on the measures they are taking to im-
plement this ban, including by establishing an appropriate mechanism for imple-
menting the provisions of paragraphs 6 and 7 above . . . . 
Id. 
 45 See Darren Mara, Rob Mudge & Jennifer Abramsohn, Britain, France Draft Libya No-
Fly Resolution at UN Security Council, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.dw-
world.de/dw/article/0,,14911884,00.html; Libya: UK Forces Prepare After Libyan No-Fly 
Zone Vote, BBC NEWS (Mar. 18, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12770467; 
Kevin Rudd, Security Council Heeds Lessons from Rwanda and Balkans, AUSTRALIAN (Mar. 
19, 2011), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/foreign-affairs/security-council-
heeds-lessons-from-rwanda-and-balkans/story-fn59nm2j-1226024272337; Nicholas Watt et 
al., Libya: UN Security Council Backs No-Fly Zone and Air Strikes, GUARDIAN (Oct. 13, 
2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/17/libya-un-security-council-air; Spokes-
person of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Statement on the Adoption by the 
United Nations Security Council of Resolution 1973 on the Situation in Libya (Mar. 18, 
2011), http://www.franceonu.org/spip.php?article5451. 
 46 See Mara, Mudge & Abramsohn, supra note 45. 
 47 Paragraph 10 of the draft resolution states: 
Authorizes members of the League of Arab States and other States which have no-
tified the Secretary-General, who are acting nationally or through regional organi-
sations [sic] or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, 
to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian objects in the Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya, and to make available humanitarian and related assistance, re-
quests that all States provide appropriate support for these measures, and further 
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graph 10 of the draft resolution in terms of the protection it extends to civil-
ians and the flexibility it gives to states to aggressively fulfill the mandate.  
This Article will compare the responses of the international com-
munity to the impending massacres in Libya and Bosnia. This Article will 
compare the legal authorizations for intervention from the Security Council, 
and the international community’s implementation of these resolutions.  
II. PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS 
Paragraph 4 of Resolution 1973 provided states with a broad legal 
mandate to protect civilians in Libya by authorizing “all necessary 
measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect 
civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation 
force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.”48 The overarching pur-
pose of Resolution 1973 was the protection of civilians, and there were five 
key ways that paragraph 4 authorized this protection: (1) a mandate to use 
“all necessary measures”; (2) protection of “civilian populated areas . . . 
including Benghazi”; (3) protection of areas “under threat of attack”; (4) an 
exception to the arms embargo “notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 
1970”; and (5) exclusion of a “foreign occupation force” that still allows for 
limited presence on the ground.49 
A. All Necessary Measures 
The Security Council quickly responded to the violence in Libya 
with a comprehensive resolution that authorized all measures necessary to 
stop attacks on civilians.50 “All necessary measures” is the language em-
ployed by the Security Council to authorize the use of force under Chapter 
VII, Article 42 of the U.N. Charter.51 While the authorization to use force to 
  
requests the Member States concerned to inform the Secretary-General immediate-
ly of the measures they take pursuant to the authority conferred by this paragraph 
which shall be immediately reported to the Security Council . . . . 
Libya: Draft Security Council Resolution, CBS NEWS (Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.cbsnews. 
com/htdocs/pdf/March_16_LibyaDraftResolution2011_1.pdf?tag=contentMain;contentBody.  
 48 S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 4, ¶ 4.  
 49 Id. 
 50 The Security Council adopted Resolution 1973, “Acting under Chapter VII of the Char-
ter of the United Nations.” Id. pmbl. The Security Council can authorize the use of force 
under Chapter VII, Article 42 of the U.N. Charter when situations pose a threat to interna-
tional peace and security. See U.N. Charter arts. 39, 41, 42. 
 51 See Jules Lobel & Michael Ratner, Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Author-
izations to Use Force, Ceasefires and the Iraqi Inspection Regime, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 124, 
129 (1999) (explaining that diplomatic considerations generally describe the use of ambigu-
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protect civilians is not unprecedented, the speed at which the Security 
Council reacted to violence in Libya is certainly refreshing. Further, the 
international coalition actually: (1) used all necessary resources, including 
attack helicopters and predator drones; and actually (2) struck all necessary 
targets to fulfill its mandate to protect civilians.  
The British-French led coalition used all resources necessary to 
immediately and aggressively fulfill its mandate to protect civilians. On 
March 19, just two days after Resolution 1973 was adopted, French planes 
attacked Gadhafi forces advancing on Benghazi, and the U.S. and U.K. 
launched over 110 cruise missiles into Libya.52 On March 31, NATO took 
over implementation of the mandate to protect civilians, and within six 
months, NATO forces had conducted 24,346 sorties and 9,082 strike sor-
ties.53 In fulfilling its mandate to protect civilians, NATO used fighter air-
craft, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft, air-to-air refuelers, un-
manned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and attack helicopters.54 At its peak, over 
260 air assets contributed to the operation, with occasional contribution 
from ships and submarines.55 Approximately 8,000 troops contributed to 
NATO’s operation,56 and France, the U.K., and Italy all deployed small 
numbers of military personnel into Libya to help organize and train Libyan 
  
ous language like “all necessary measures” or “all necessary means” to authorize the use of 
force).  
 52 Libya: US, UK and France Attack Gaddafi Forces, supra note 13.  
 53 NATO, supra note 14. A sortie is “one mission or attack by a single plane.” See Sortie 
Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sortie 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2011). “Strike sorties are intended to identify and engage appropriate 
targets, but do not necessarily deploy munitions each time.” See NATO, supra note 14. 
 54 Public Diplomacy Div., NATO, Operation Unified Protector Protection of Civilians 
and Civilian Populated Areas (June 2011) [hereinafter Operation Unified Protector June 
2011], http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_06/20110608_Factsheet-UP_Prot 
ection_Civilians.pdf. 
 55 Public Diplomacy Div., NATO, Operation Unified Protector, Protection of Civilians 
and Civilian-Populated Areas & Enforcement of the No-Fly Zone (Oct. 2011) [hereinafter 
Operation Unified Protector Oct. 2011], available at http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets 
/pdf/pdf_2011_10/20111005_111005-factsheet_protection_civilians.pdf. 
 56 Id. 
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opposition forces.57 Additionally, France airdropped arms to Libyan opposi-
tion forces in June when the fighting appeared to reach a stalemate.58 
The contribution by the U.K. and France of attack helicopters to the 
NATO campaign demonstrated these states’ commitment to provide all nec-
essary resources to protect civilians, including at the risk of life to their own 
pilots. Although attack helicopters are better able to conduct precision air-
strikes in urban areas, they are more vulnerable to being hit by missiles be-
cause they are relatively slow and fly low to the ground. 59 Despite this dan-
ger, in June, the U.K. contributed Apache attack helicopters and France 
contributed Tigre and Gazelle attack helicopters to the NATO campaign.60 
Some commentators hailed the July introduction of attack helicopters as a 
“game changer” in a conflict that was beginning to look like a stalemate.61  
In addition to French and British attack helicopters, the U.S. de-
ployed unmanned predator drones with hellfire missiles into Libya.62 A re-
source that only the U.S. can provide, predator drones are well-known for 
their use in targeted killings of individual al Qaeda operatives.63 In one of 
the more controversial elements of the NATO campaign, predator drones 
may have been used in Libya in an attempt to target Gadhafi.64 
The international coalition also struck a wide range of targets in its 
implementation of “all necessary measures.” As of October, NATO had 
destroyed over 5,900 military targets, including over 400 artillery or rocket 
launchers, over 600 tanks or armored vehicles, and over 400 military com-
  
 57 Alan Cowell & Ravi Somaiya, France and Italy Will Also Send Advisers to Libya Re-
bels, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/21/world/africa/21libya. 
html?pagewanted=all; Foreign Secretary Announces Assistance to the National Transitional 
Council in Libya, FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFF. (Apr. 19, 2011), http://www.fco.gov.uk/ 
en/news/latest-news/?view=News&id=582334882 [hereinafter Foreign Council Announce-
ment to NTC]. This will be discussed in more detail in the sections on the arms embargo and 
the exclusion of a foreign occupation force. 
 58 David Jolly & Kareem Fahim, France Says It Gave Arms to the Rebels in Libya, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 30, 2011, at A4. This will be discussed in more detail in the arms embargo sec-
tion. 
 59 John F. Burns, NATO Begins Helicopter Attacks in the Hope of Ending the Stalemate 
with Qaddafi, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2011, at A18. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id.; see also U.K., French Helicopters Strike Qaddafi Troops, CBS NEWS (June 4, 
2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/06/04/501364/main20068953.shtml. 
 62 Libya: U.S. Confirms First Predator Strike, BBC NEWS (Apr. 23, 2011), http://www. 
bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13176645. 
 63 Mark Mazzetti, C.I.A. Kills Top Qaeda Operative in Drone Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 
2011, at A8; see also Predator Drones and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 1, 2011, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/u/unmanned_aer 
ial_vehicles/index.html. 
 64 See infra Part C for further discussion on the potential targeting of Gadhafi.  
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mand and control centers.65 Targets included the usual suspects—anti-
aircraft facilities, bunkers, ammunition storage sites, armored personnel 
carriers, artillery vehicles, command and control facilities, armored vehi-
cles, buildings, missiles, helicopters, anti-aircraft guns, rocket launchers, 
surface to air missile launchers, tanks, and vehicle storage buildings66—and 
some unusual suspects, including television satellites,67 Gadhafi’s palaces,68 
and perhaps Gadhafi himself.69  
The immediate and aggressive implementation of “all necessary 
measures” was a dramatic shift from the timid and tardy implementation 
conducted by the international community in response to attacks on civil-
ians in Bosnia. In Bosnia, over a year passed before the Security Council 
authorized U.N. member states to take “all necessary measures, through the 
use of airpower” to protect “safe areas.”70 And even after the Security 
Council authorized the use of force, force was rarely actually used. In one 
instance, in response to Serbian attacks on a safe area, General Michael 
Rose delivered a letter to Serbian military leader Ratco Mladić asking Ser-
bia to please stop violating the weapons exclusion zone.71 Another time, in 
response to Serbian attacks on civilians, General Rupert Smith wrote to 
Mladić to remind him that Smith had the authority to order NATO air-
strikes, though he did not actually do so.72 And yet another time, in response 
to the killing of one U.N. peacekeeper and the wounding of four others, 
General Michael Rose “lodged an official complaint” with Bosnian Serb 
leaders.73 Throughout the war in Bosnia, U.N. officials repeatedly denied 
NATO permission to target Serbian anti-aircraft systems despite repeated 
  
 65 Operation Unified Protector Oct. 2011, supra note 55.  
 66 Rogers, supra note 3.  
 67 NATO Strikes Libyan State TV Satellite Facility, NATO (July 30, 2011), http://www. 
nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_76776.htm?selectedLocale=en. 
 68 Tom Shanker & David E. Sanger, NATO Plans to Take War to Qaddafi’s Doorstep, 
N.Y. TIMES, April 26, 2011, at A10.  
 69 David Batty, Libyan Forces Loyal to Gaddafi Attacked on Retreat from Misrata, 
GUARDIAN (April 23, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/23/gaddafi-forces-
attacked-misrata/print (discussing the attack on the Gadhafi compound).  
 70 S.C. Res. 836, supra note 18, ¶ 10.  
 71 BALKAN WATCH (Action Council for Peace in the Balkans, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 19, 
1994, available at http://publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011 
/09/Vol.-1-Issue-2-Sept.-19-19942.pdf.  
 72 BALKAN WATCH (Action Council for Peace in the Balkans, Washington, D.C.), Apr. 17, 
1995, available at http://publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011 
/09/Vol.-2-Issue-14-April-17-19951.pdf. 
 73 BALKAN WATCH (Action Council for Peace in the Balkans, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 19, 
1994, available at http://publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011 
/09/Vol.-1-Issue-15-Dec.-19-19941.pdf. 
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attacks on NATO planes and despite an authorization to use “all necessary 
measures.”74 
When force was used by NATO in Bosnia, it was usually in the 
form of pinprick airstrikes. In one instance, after two months of no air-
strikes, and in retaliation for repeated Serbian attacks on peacekeepers, 
NATO warplanes attacked a single, unmanned tank.75 Another time, NATO 
forces struck an airport runway, purposely leaving a number of planes next 
to the runway intact.76 Soon thereafter, these runways were used by the Ser-
bians to resupply their forces.77 Furthermore, when NATO did decide to 
conduct airstrikes, the U.N. often informed Serbian forces in advance. In 
October of 1994, the U.N. and NATO settled on a draft agreement that 
would finally allow NATO to conduct airstrikes without warning “unless 
the U.N. feels that civilians may be endangered.”78 
While the international community in Bosnia hesitated to authorize 
force and then failed to use the full extent of force authorized, approximate-
ly one hundred thousand lives were lost and 2.2 million civilians dis-
placed.79 Fortunately for the Libyan people, the Security Council did not 
wait for wide-spread massacres before authorizing “all necessary 
measures,” and the British-French led coalition did not hesitate to imple-
ment the full scope of its mandate by using all available resources and by 
striking all crucial targets.  
B. Civilian Populated Areas . . . Including Benghazi 
Resolution 1973 extended protection to civilians and “civilian 
populated areas . . . including Benghazi.”80 According to the Geneva Con-
vention, even if military personnel are present in an area, their presence 
  
 74 BALKAN WATCH (Action Council for Peace in the Balkans, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 12, 
1994, available at http://publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011 
/09/Vol.-1-Issue-14-Dec.-12-19941.pdf. 
 75 BALKAN WATCH (Action Council for Peace in the Balkans, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 26, 
1994, available at http://publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011 
/09/Vol.-1-Issue-3-Sept.-26-19942.pdf.  
 76 BALKAN WATCH, supra note 24.  
 77 BALKAN WATCH (Action Council for Peace in the Balkans, Washington, D.C.), Jan. 23, 
1995, available at http://publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011 
/09/Vol.-2-Issue-2-Jan.-23-19951.pdf. 
 78 BALKAN WATCH (Action Council for Peace in the Balkans, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 31, 
1994, available at http://publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011 
/09/Vol.-1-Issue-8-Oct.-31-19941.pdf. 
 79 Bosnia War Dead Figure Announced, supra note 20; UNHCR, supra note 20. 
 80 S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 4, ¶ 4. 
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does not “deprive [the] area of its civilian nature.”81 Thus, coupled with the 
Geneva Convention, three words—“civilian populated areas”—authorized 
states to use force to protect entire towns and villages in Libya, even if legit-
imate military targets existed within them, so long as civilians were pre-
sent.82 
The explicit inclusion of Benghazi in Resolution 1973 as a protect-
ed area was especially significant because it was the command and control 
center for the Libyan opposition since the revolution began in February.83 
This was a clear acknowledgment by the Security Council that the Gadhafi 
regime and the Libyan opposition were not moral equals entitled to the 
same protection.  
An earlier draft of the resolution limited protection to “civilians and 
civilian objects.”84 Resolution 1973 broadened the scope of protection to 
include entire “civilian populated areas” of Libya and thus everything—not 
just “civilians and civilian objects”—within those areas. This authorized 
NATO forces to protect non-civilians—including the Libyan opposition 
forces—as long as they were within an area populated by at least one civil-
ian. By extending protection to “civilian populated areas . . . including Ben-
ghazi,” the Security Council recognized that those needing protection may 
also be engaged in self-defense. This phrase was crafted in such a way that 
not only permitted Libyans to engage in self-defense, but also assisted them 
in doing so.  
The British-French led coalition and NATO vigorously protected 
Benghazi and other “civilian populated areas” from Gadhafi’s forces by 
conducting airstrikes in and around at least thirty-five towns and cities in 
Libya.85 NATO interpreted Resolution 1973 as allowing it to deter attacks 
by the Gadhafi regime on the Libyan opposition and to provide close air 
support as the Libyan opposition moved from one town to the next. States 
also worked with the National Transitional Council (NTC) to ensure that 
they understood the laws of war and how to appropriately treat prisoners.86  
  
 81 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S 3. 
 82 S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 4, ¶ 4. 
 83 See id.; see also Into the Unknown; The Libya Campaign, ECONOMIST, Mar. 26, 2011, at 
29 (describing Benghazi as a stronghold for the Libyan opposition forces and important 
because of Resolution 1973 which allowed allies to use ‘all necessary measures’ to protect 
civilians in areas like Bengahzi from Gadhafi’s forces).  
 84 See Libya: Draft Security Council Resolution, supra note 47, ¶ 10. 
 85 Rogers, supra note 3 (picturing the concentration of missiles around the cities, especial-
ly Tripoli and Brega).  
 86 Michelle Faul, Libyan Rebels Distribute Rules on POW Treatment, MSNBC (May 30, 
2011), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/43218412/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/libyan-
rebels-distribute-rules-pow-treatment/ (reporting that the NTC distributed guidelines on how 
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This broad mandate to protect all civilian populated areas, and its 
aggressive implementation, was a significant departure from the limited 
“safe areas” that supposedly received protection during the war in Bosnia. 
In response to attacks on civilians in Srebrenica, the Security Council des-
ignated Srebrenica as a “safe area which should be free from any armed 
attack . . . ,”87 but did not at first authorize means by which states could pro-
tect Srebrenica. Less than a month later, the Security Council designated 
five additional “safe areas,” including Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, and 
Bihać, but still no means by which to protect them. 88 Finally, in June of 
1993, the Security Council authorized states to use all necessary measures 
to deter attacks against the six safe areas.89 However, even after the Security 
Council authorized the use of force to protect the six safe areas, the U.N. 
and NATO rarely provided the protection that was needed. Tragically, over 
two years after Srebrenica was designated as a safe area, more than eight 
thousand civilians were killed by Serbian forces in the Srebrenica massa-
cre.90 
C. Under Threat of Attack 
Resolution 1973 extended protection to civilians and civilian popu-
lated areas “under threat of attack,” and in doing so, provided NATO with 
the flexibility to successfully fulfill its mandate to protect civilians.91 Au-
thorizing the protection of civilians “under threat of attack” may seem like 
common sense for a resolution with the goal of protecting civilians, but the 
Security Council does not often authorize the use of force before an attack 
actually occurs or unless an attack is imminent.  
In fact, in an earlier draft of the resolution, the drafters had limited 
protection to a traditional mandate—“civilians and civilian objects in the 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya”—without extending protection to civilians “under 
the threat of attack.”92 Fortunately, the resolution was redrafted to include 
flexibility for NATO to stop attacks on civilians before they occurred. 
While some commentators disagree with what NATO construed to consti-
  
to treat POWs, but that the U.N. Human Rights Council is still investigating extra-judicial 
killings on both sides of the fighting). 
 87 S.C. Res. 819, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/819 (Apr. 16 1993). 
 88 S.C. Res. 824, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/824 (May 6, 1993). 
 89 S.C. Res. 836, supra note 18, ¶¶ 5, 9, 10. 
 90 Helge Brunborg, Torkild Hovde Lyngstad & Henrik Urdal, Accounting for Genocide: 
How Many Were Killed in Srebrenica? 19 EUR. J. POPULATION 229, 229 (2003) (concluding 
that at least 7,475 people were killed in Srebrenica during the conflict). 
 91 S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 4, ¶ 4 (authorizing member states to take all necessary 
measure to protect civilians but requiring notification to the security council immediately 
afterward).  
 92 See Libya: Draft Security Council Resolution, supra note 47, ¶ 10. 
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tute a threat of attack, favoring a narrower interpretation,93 this clause pro-
vided NATO with the flexibility necessary to adapt the campaign to the 
changing circumstances on the ground and to strike all targets that posed a 
risk to civilians. 
Moreover, such a limited response would be all too reminiscent of 
the limited mandate in Bosnia Resolution 836 authorizing states to use force 
“in reply to bombardments” against safe areas.94 The language of Resolu-
tion 836 ironically appeared to require the aggressors to have already at-
tacked civilians in the designated safe areas before states could use force to 
protect them, leading to more civilian casualties. Resolution 1973 better 
protected civilians by providing states implementing the resolution—rather 
than technocrats negotiating the text of the resolution—with the latitude to 
determine which objects, facilities, actions, and people posed a threat of 
attack to civilians in Libya.  
Fortunately for the Libyan people, NATO did not shy away from 
eliminating threats of attack to civilians. As of October, NATO had de-
stroyed nearly six thousand military targets.95 In order to begin to make 
sense of NATO’s list of targets, this Article synthesized NATO’s imple-
mentation of its mandate into five categories of “threat of attack”: (1) immi-
nent threat of attack; (2) capacity to attack; (3) command and control; (4) 
incitement to attack; and (5) combat support role. Moving from category 
one to category five, the “threat” the targets posed to civilians reached the 
fringes of the mandate, yet all targets were deemed necessary to protect 
civilians.  
The least controversial of NATO’s targets were those that constitut-
ed the most imminent threat to civilians: Gadhafi forces around or ap-
proaching civilian populated areas. NATO targets within this category in-
cluded Gadhafi ground forces, tanks, and artillery outside of Libyan towns 
and villages.96 Destroying targets that posed an imminent threat to civilians 
was a key objective early in the campaign when Gadhafi forces were stag-
ing offensives against opposition-held areas, including Benghazi.  
The second category of targets were those which gave Gadhafi the 
capacity to attack in the future and were necessary to destroy in order to 
prevent impending attacks against civilians. This category included weap-
ons depots and ammunition bunkers, unmanned tanks, and supply lines to 
Gadhafi regime forces. Also falling within the first and second categories 
  
 93 See Welsh, supra note 16, at 1 (arguing that because Resolution 1973 only mentioned 
the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect, not the international community, this 
showed the Security Council still debated the appropriate rationale for military action). 
 94 S.C. Res. 836, supra note 18, ¶ 9. 
 95 Operation Unified Protector Oct. 2011, supra note 55. 
 96 Steven Erlanger & Eric Schmitt, NATO Set to Take Full Command of Libyan Cam-
paign, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2011, at A4. 
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were defensive measures taken by the British-French led coalition and by 
NATO forces to ensure that their mandate under Resolution 1973 could be 
safely carried out. Defensive targets included anti-aircraft facilities and 
guns, rocket launchers, surface to air missile launchers, and all other targets 
that could endanger pilots. 
The third category of targets NATO interpreted to constitute a 
threat of attack during the operation were “command and control” or 
“communication” centers. NATO described command and control centers 
as facilities “used to coordinate such attacks by regime forces,”97 and there-
fore their destruction was necessary to halt direct commands for attacks on 
civilians. Such facilities included Gadhafi “palaces, headquarters and com-
munication centers.”98 Many observers interpreted attacks on these places as 
an indication that NATO was targeting the Colonel himself.99  
The apparent targeting of Gadhafi was one of the most controversial 
elements of the NATO campaign.100 At the beginning of the operation, 
NATO shied away from admitting that strikes on or near Gadhafi’s com-
pounds were aimed at killing the leader himself: “We don’t want to kill him 
. . . but if he sees the bombing happening all around him, we think it could 
change his calculus,”101 said one senior NATO diplomat. Following air-
strikes on a residential compound in Tripoli that killed one of Gadhafi’s 
sons and three of his grandchildren, NATO again denied that Gadhafi had 
been the target: “All NATO’s targets are military in nature and have been 
clearly linked to the [Gadhafi] regime’s systematic attacks on the Libyan 
population and populated areas. We do not target individuals,” said Lieu-
tenant General Charles Bouchard.102 Although NATO officials remained 
  
 97 Karin Laub & Hadeel Al-Shalchi, NATO Strike on Gadhafi HQ Raises Pressure on 
Him, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/apr/25/ 
nato-airtrikes-hit-gadhafis-compound/ (targeting the command and control facilities that 
coordinated attacks on civilians). 
 98 Tom Shanker & David E. Sanger, NATO Says It Is Stepping Up Attacks on Libya Tar-
gets, N.Y. TIMES, April 26, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/27/world/ 
middleeast/27strategy.html?_r=1. 
 99 See Rod Nordland, Libyan Rebels Say They Have Control of Misurata, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 24, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/25/world/africa/25libya.html? 
_r=1&hp (reporting on bombs falling near Gadhafi’s compound in Tripoli); see also John F. 
Burns, NATO Bombs Libyan Capital in Heaviest Strike Yet, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2011, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/25/world/africa/25libya.html (similarly report-
ing on 15 airstrike targets around Gadhafi’s command compound).  
100 See Pinpoint Accuracy, supra note 5 (debating impermissible activities under Resolu-
tion 1973, including express military actions designed to kill Gadhafi or force him into exile, 
to ensure rebel victory in a civil war, or to achieve a more open and responsive system of 
government in Libya). 
101 Shanker & Sanger, supra note 98. 
102 Ian Traynor, NATO Denies Targeting Muammar Gaddafi, GUARDIAN (May 1, 2011), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/01/libya-nato-gaddafi-un-resolution. 
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hesitant to say explicitly that they were targeting Gadhafi, later in the cam-
paign, NATO did argue that Resolution 1973 allowed for the targeting of 
Gadhafi because, “as head of the military, he is part of the control and 
command structure and therefore a legitimate target.”103  However, in the 
October 20 NATO airstrike on a Gadhafi convoy fleeing Sirte, which led to 
the Colonel’s capture, French Defense Minister Gerard Longuet said that, 
“At the time of the strike, NATO did not know that [Gadhafi] was in the 
convoy.” 104 Presumably, if Gadhafi was indeed giving orders to attack civil-
ians, he would constitute a threat of attack to those civilians. 
The fourth category of NATO targets were facilities used to incite 
attack against the Libyan opposition. In August, NATO conducted a preci-
sion airstrike that hit three Libyan state television satellite transmission 
dishes in Tripoli.105 NATO’s purpose was to “degrad[e] Qadhafi’s use of 
satellite television as a means to intimidate the Libyan people and incite acts 
of violence against them.”106 Thus, NATO determined that limiting 
Gadhafi’s ability to incite attacks against civilians—by eliminating his abil-
ity to reach wide audiences—was necessary to prevent attacks against civil-
ians. Despite NATO’s purpose for targeting state-run media, this action 
received a great deal of criticism from the international community, includ-
ing UNESCO, which deplored the targeting of media outlets, even if used 
for propaganda.107  
The fifth category of targets interpreted to pose a threat of attack 
were those struck while NATO played a combat support role for the Libyan 
opposition. When opposition forces advanced on Tripoli in August, they did 
so with close air support from NATO and in coordination with NATO 
command and control.108 NATO also provided some coverage for Libyan 
opposition forces to liberate the last remaining Gadhafi strongholds, includ-
  
103 Fran Townsend, NATO Official: Gadhafi a Legitimate Target, CNN (June 9, 2011), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-09/world/libya.gadhafi_1_nato-official-libyan-leader-moam 
mar-gadhafi-libya-mission?_s=PM:WORLD. 
104 Luis Martinez, Timeline of NATO Airstrikes on Gadhafi Convoys, ABC NEWS (Oct. 21, 
2011), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/10/tick-tock-of-nato-airstrikes-on-gadhafi-
convoys/. 
105 NATO Strikes Libyan State TV Satellite Facility, supra note 67. 
106 Id. 
107 UN Official Deplores NATO Attack on Libyan TV, REUTERS (Aug. 9, 2011), 
http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE77802120110809 (“Silencing the media is 
never a solution . . . . Fostering independent and pluralistic media is the only way to enable 
people to form their own opinion.”); see also Media Group Condemns NATO Bombing of 
Libyan TV, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/08/ 
03/501364/main20087859.shtml (condemning the bombings because they targeted journal-
ists and threatened their lives). 
108 Libyan Rebels Take Fight to Tripoli, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 20, 2011), http://www. 
cbsnews.com/stories/2011/08/20/501364/main20095027.shtml.  
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ing Sirte.109  However, the extent of NATO’s participation in the liberation 
of Sirte was likely limited.  By October, NATO strike missions had report-
edly dropped from fifty a day to about two dozen, perhaps because NATO 
recognized that, “The ability of NATO to affect the fighting inside [Sirte] is 
small.” 110   
When Libyan opposition forces arrived in Sirte, Tripoli had already 
fallen and Gadhafi was no longer in control of Libya. Thus, some argued 
that Gadhafi’s forces no longer posed a threat of attack to civilians at this 
time. Reportedly, however, there were still civilians in Sirte under attack by 
Gadhafi’s forces.111 A U.S. Air Force lieutenant general said that “loyalist 
gunmen in pickup trucks are terrorizing residents, killing some and intimi-
dating many others.”112 While support for opposition forces in the liberation 
of Sirte may have been at the fringes of NATO’s mandate, there was rela-
tively little criticism of NATO’s participation in this regard. The fact that 
this may have been legally uncomfortable was likely outweighed by the 
international community’s desire to bring about an end to the war.  
D. Notwithstanding Paragraph 9  
Resolution 1973 authorized states to arm and train the National 
Transitional Council so long as it was necessary for the protection of civil-
ians. It does so by creating an exception to paragraph 9 of Resolution 1970 
which required states “to prevent the . . . supply, sale or transfer to the Liby-
an Arab Jamahiriya . . . of arms and related materiel of all types . . . and 
technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance, related to mili-
tary activities . . . .”113 In paragraph 4 of Resolution 1973, the Security 
Council authorized states to take all necessary measures to protect civilians 
“notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).”114 In common 
language, when “notwithstanding” is used as a preposition, as it is in para-
  
109 See Eric Schmitt, NATO Commander Says Resilience of the Qaddafi Loyalists Is Sur-
prising, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2011, at A12. At the time of writing this article, it is unclear 
how large of a role NATO is playing in the attempted liberation of Sirte. See also Karin Laub 
& Slobodan Lekic, NATO Ends Victorious Libya Campaign, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 31, 
2011), http://www.time,com/time/world/article/0,8599,2098327,00.html (reporting the con-
clusion of NATO’s seven month campaign against Libya following the death of Muammar 
Gadhafi).  
110 Schmitt, supra note 109.  
111 See Peter Beaumont, Sirte Residents Queue to Leave City During Two-Day Ceasefire, 
THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 2, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/02/sirte-residents-
leave-ceasefire?newsfeed=true (reporting that although the NTC established a two-day 
ceasefire for civilians to leave Sirte, many civilians still remain). 
112 See Schmitt, supra note 109. 
113 S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 4, ¶ 9.  
114 Id. ¶ 4. 
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graph 4, it means “despite.”115 Thus, states could use all necessary measures 
to protect civilians “[despite] paragraph 9” of Resolution 1970. Although 
the meaning of this phrase has been debated, the logical interpretation is that 
this phrase created an exception to the paragraph 9 arms embargo for 
measures that were necessary to protect civilians—measures that may in-
clude arming and training civilians so that they may protect themselves.  
In an earlier draft of the paragraph authorizing protection of civil-
ians, no mention was made to the arms embargo in Resolution 1970. 116 The 
subsequent inclusion of “notwithstanding paragraph 9” in Resolution 1973 
shows that the drafters of the resolution purposely and thoughtfully created 
an exception to the arms embargo. The addition of this phrase reflects an 
understanding by the Security Council that those who need protection may 
also be engaged in self-defense. Yet, despite the inclusion of “notwithstand-
ing paragraph 9,” some commentators are skeptical that this phrase was 
intended by the Security Council to create an exception to the arms embar-
go, arguing that it would never have passed if that had been so.117 Others are 
simply critical of the fact that “notwithstanding paragraph 9” did indeed 
create an exception to the arms embargo, 118 preferring an arms embargo 
that would have applied equally to the Gadhafi regime and the Libyan op-
position.119 
Such an interpretation fails to heed the lessons learned the hard way 
in Bosnia. In Resolution 713 (1991), the Security Council established a 
“general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military 
equipment to Yugoslavia until the Council decides otherwise.”120 However, 
even while Serbian forces committed atrocities against Bosnian civilians, 
the Security Council neglected to modify the arms embargo so that the Bos-
  
115 Notwithstanding Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster. 
com/dictionary/notwithstanding (last visited Feb. 29, 2012). 
116 An earlier draft of the resolution did not have the “notwithstanding paragraph 9” provi-
sion. See Libya: Draft Security Council Resolution, supra note 47, ¶ 9.  
117 Marko Milanovic, Can the Allies Lawfully Arm the Libyan Rebels?, EJIL: TALK! BLOG 
(Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.ejiltalk.org/can-the-allies-lawfully-arm-the-lybian-rebels/ (wor-
rying that the Security Council implicitly took sides in this conflict and created a wink-wink 
embargo exception). 
118 Dapo Akande, Does SC Resolution 1973 Permit Coalition Military Support for the 
Libyan Rebels?, EJIL: TALK! BLOG (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.ejiltalk.org/does-sc-resol 
ution-1973-permit-coalition-military-support-for-the-libyan-rebels/ (arguing that the law did 
create an exception to the arms embargo to assist the protection of civilians and civilian 
populated areas). 
119 Yaaser Vanderman, Is Providing Arms to Libyan Rebels Illegal?, LAW THINK BLOG 
(Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.lawthink.co.uk/2011/03/is-providing-arms-to-libyan-rebels-ill 
egal/ (showing that the drafters of Resolution 1973 did not really through the resolution as an 
exception to the arms embargo. However, Secretary Clinton stated that the US interpreted 
that Resolution 1973 overrode the absolute prohibition on arms to anyone in Libya). 
120 S.C. Res. 713, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/713 (Sept. 25, 1991).  
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nians could protect themselves.121 Individual states also failed to lift the 
arms embargo for the Bosnians during much of the war despite other legal 
justifications for doing so, including the right of self-defense and the fact 
that Bosnia and Herzegovina had become an independent state since adop-
tion of Resolution 713, which placed an embargo on “Yugoslavia.” At one 
point, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé denounced a U.S. decision to 
stop enforcing the arms embargo against the Bosnian Government as “fa-
voring those who wanted war over those who wanted peace.”122 However, 
U.N. peacekeepers and NATO troops rarely used force to stop violations of 
the arms embargo. Thus, a two-sided arms embargo had the unintended 
effect of protecting Serbian forces—which regularly violated the embar-
go—while keeping Bosnian civilians defenseless. In one instance, U.N. 
observers watched idly as 15–20 helicopters flew from Serbia to arm Serbi-
an forces on the outskirts of Srebrenica.123 Because the Bosnian Govern-
ment was the only side realistically subjected to the arms embargo, Bosnian 
civilians were left unprotected when Serbian forces attacked them.  
Fortunately, “notwithstanding paragraph 9” was interpreted aggres-
sively by the French and Americans, and narrowly by the British, to allow 
for arming of the Libyan opposition. The U.S. believed that “notwithstand-
ing paragraph 9” created a blanket exception to the arms embargo: “[Reso-
lution] 1973 amended or overrode the absolute prohibition of arms to any-
one in Libya so that there could be legitimate transfer of arms if a country 
were to choose to do that,” said U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton.124 
The U.K., on the other hand, interpreted “notwithstanding paragraph 9” 
more narrowly, to allow only for arming the Libyan opposition with “defen-
sive weapons” in “certain limited circumstance.”125 On June 29, France was 
  
121 See S.C. Res. 724, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/724 (Dec. 15, 1991) (providing procedures for 
ensuring member state compliance with arms embargo covering Bosnia and Yugoslavia and 
calling upon states to fulfill obligations of previously instituted arms embargo); see also S.C. 
Res. 757, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. S/Res/757 (May 30, 1992) (requesting further details from states 
regarding implementation of arms embargo and soliciting requests for ways to improve em-
bargo effectiveness).  
122 BALKAN WATCH (Action Council for Peace in the Balkans, Washington, D.C.), Nov. 21, 
1994, available at http://publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/upl 
oads/2011/09/Vol.-1-Issue-11-Nov.-21-19941.pdf. 
123 BALKAN WATCH (Action Council for Peace in the Balkans, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 6, 
1995, available at http://publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011 
/09/Vol.-2-Issue-4-Feb.-6-19951.pdf. 
124 Nicolas Watt, U.S. Paves Way to Arm Libyan Rebels, GUARDIAN (Mar. 29, 2011), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/29/arms-libya-rebels. 
125 Richard Spencer, France Supplying Weapons to Libyan Rebels, THE TELEGRAPH (U.K.) 
(June 29, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/Libya 
/8606541/France-supplying-weapons-to-Libyan-rebels.html (stating that although the U.K. 
has adopted a broader interpretation of Resolution 1973, the U.K. is not currently involved in 
providing defensive weapons). 
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the first and only of the three NATO leaders to confirm that it had actually 
provided weapons to the Libyan opposition.126 France airdropped assault 
rifles, machine guns, and rocket-propelled grenades and launchers to rebels 
in Misrata and the Nafusa Mountains.127 The airdrop was credited with 
breaking the stalemate with Gadhafi forces in the Nafusa Mountain re-
gion.128 Egypt,129 Qatar,130 and the United Arab Emirates131 also reportedly 
provided weapons to the Libyan opposition. Such efforts were credited with 
providing ill-equipped opposition troops with the means to defend them-
selves against Gadhafi forces and with the ability to forge offensive fronts 
against his regime.132 
In Resolution 2009, the Security Council crafted further exceptions 
to the arms embargo, including an exception for “arms and related materiel 
of all types, including technical assistance, training, financial and other as-
sistance, intended solely for security or disarmament assistance to the Liby-
an authorities.”133 While on its face this may appear to be redundant if 
“notwithstanding paragraph 9” did indeed create an exception to the arms 
embargo for the Libyan opposition, a close reading of the two provisions 
reveals that the two exceptions are in fact created for different purposes. 
“Notwithstanding paragraph 9” in Resolution 1973 lifted the arms embargo 
for NTC forces if it was necessary to protect civilians under threat of attack. 
On the other hand, paragraph 13(a) of Resolution 2009 lifted the arms em-
bargo for the new Libyan authorities “for security or disarmament assis-
tance.”134 Thus, the inclusion of additional exceptions to the arms embargo 
in Resolution 2009 did not undermine the argument that “notwithstanding 
paragraph 9” created an exception to the arms embargo for the Libyan op-
position. 
E. Excluding a Foreign Occupation Force 
Resolution 1973 allowed states the flexibility of putting limited for-
eign intelligence and military personnel on the ground in Libya so long as 
they did not constitute “a foreign occupation force of any form on any part 
  
126 Jolly & Fahim, supra note 59.  
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Charles Levinson & Matthew Rosenberg, Egypt Said to Arm Libya Rebels, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 17, 2011, at A6.  
130 Ian Black, Libyan Rebels Receiving Anti-Tank Weapons from Qatar, GUARDIAN (Apr. 
14, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/14/libya-rebels-weapons-qatar. 
131 Jolly & Fahim, supra note 59. 
132 Id. (explaining the strategy of the opposition rebels to gain ground against Gadhafi). 
133 S.C. Res. 2009, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2009 (Sept. 16, 2011).  
134 Id. 
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of Libyan territory.”135 While on its face, this provision would appear to 
exclude the presence of any boots on the ground, 136 it in fact appears that 
the drafters cleverly chose the term “occupation force,” which is not without 
legal significance. According to the Hague Convention IV, a “[t]erritory is 
considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the 
hostile army[,]”137 and comes under the “effective control of hostile foreign 
armed forces.”138 Any foreign intelligence or military presence on the 
ground in Libya falling short of this did not constitute foreign occupation of 
the territory. 
An earlier draft of the resolution did not include any reference to 
exclusion of a foreign occupation force,139 meaning that the drafters thought 
very carefully about including this clause. Some commentators interpret the 
inclusion of this phrase as expressing the intent of the Security Council to 
avoid a situation similar to Iraq.140 While this phrase certainly set the tone 
that there would not be heavily-armed peacekeeping forces in Libya, it also 
represents clever drafting that allowed for some military presence on the 
ground. This phrase ultimately provided states fulfilling the mandate with a 
wider range of available measures to protect civilians as the conflict pro-
gressed.  
Utilizing the latitude provided by this provision, states used limited 
troops on the ground to gather intelligence, direct airstrikes, and organize 
and train the opposition as the conflict evolved. The British, French, and 
Italians interpreted Resolution 1973 to allow them to legally deploy small 
numbers of military personnel to assist the Libyan opposition. However, 
their governments, to varying degrees, shied away from explicitly describ-
ing their assistance as military training of the Libyan opposition.141 Prior to 
  
135 S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 4, ¶ 4.  
136 Pinpoint Accuracy, supra note 5.  
137 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 42, Oct. 18, 1907, 
205 C.T.S. 277. 
138 Occupation and International Humanitarian Law: Questions and Answers, INT’L 
COMM. RED CROSS (Aug. 4, 2004), http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/634 
kfc.htm (stating that international law makes no distinction between an occupation, libera-
tion, invasion, or administration and international humanitarian law takes effect when a 
territory is under the effective control of hostile forces). 
139 See Libya: Draft Security Council Resolution, supra note 47. 
140 Compare Libya UN Resolution 1973: Text Analysed, BBC NEWS (Mar. 18, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12782972 (claiming that because Resolution 1973 
specifically excludes any foreign occupation force that the operation will not be another Iraq 
and instead would have a clear limit), with Jeff Bridoux, Why Libya Will Not Be a Second 
Iraq, OPENDEMOCRACY (Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/jeff-
bridoux/why-libya-will-not-be-second-iraq (analyzing the problems with Resolution 1973’s 
vagueness). 
141 While training of NTC forces would have been excluded under paragraph 9 of Resolu-
tion 1970, it likely falls under the “notwithstanding paragraph 9” exclusion to the arms em-
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deployment, the French said that their officers would “organize the protec-
tion of the civilian population.”142 Italian Defense Minister Ignazio La 
Russa said that Italian officers would act “according to the needs” of the 
rebels, but that their role would fall short of being “on the battlefield.”143 
British Foreign Secretary William Hague said that British officers would 
help the NTC to “improve their military organizational structures, commu-
nications, and logistics” but would not “be involved in training or arming 
the opposition’s fighting forces” or “in the planning or execution of the 
NTC’s military operations” or giving “any other form of operational mili-
tary advice.”144 Additionally, British Special Forces and MI6 intelligence 
officers were reportedly gathering intelligence in Libya and directing British 
airstrikes since March,145 and U.S. CIA operatives were reportedly working 
in Libya since the conflict began.146  
III. NO FLY ZONE WITH TEETH 
Resolution 1973 established a no fly zone that applied to all flights 
over Libya and immediately allowed member states to use force to imple-
ment it. When the international community first began to discuss interven-
tion in Libya, the phrase on the tip of everyone’s tongue was “no fly zone.” 
By the time the Security Council met on March 17 to vote on Resolution 
1973, much of the world—including the Arab League—supported the idea 
of a no fly zone.147 Paragraph 6 established a “ban on all flights in the air-
space of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya”148 and paragraph 8 authorized mem-
ber states to take “all necessary measures to enforce compliance with the 
ban on flights.”149 Though it seems like common sense that the Security 
Council would immediately authorize measures allowing states to enforce 
the no fly zone, it does not always actually do so. 
In Bosnia, the Security Council “established a ban on military 
flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina”150 in October 1992, but 
  




144 Foreign Council Announcement to NTC, supra note 57.  
145 Mark Mazzetti & Eric Schmidt, C.I.A. Spies Aiding Airstrikes and Assessing Qaddafi’s 
Foes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2011, at A1.  
146 Id. 
147 Leiby & Mansour, supra note 39.  
148 S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 4, ¶ 6.  
149 Id. ¶ 8.  
150 S.C. Res. 781, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/781 (Oct. 9, 1992); see also S.C. Res. 816, ¶ 1, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/816 (Mar. 31, 1993) (extending the no-fly zone from just military aircraft 
to “all fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft”).  
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did not authorize member states to take “all necessary measures . . . to en-
sure compliance with the ban on flights” until nearly six months later.151 
During those six months, the U.N. reported 465 violations of the no fly 
zone.152 Even after the Security Council authorized “all necessary 
measures” to enforce the no fly zone, NATO forces rarely actually enforced 
it. In fact, U.N. officials repeatedly denied NATO permission to target Ser-
bian anti-aircraft systems despite repeated attacks on NATO planes.153 
When NATO did take measures to enforce the no fly zone, it often did so by 
inflicting only minimal damage to aircraft runways, sometimes specifically 
avoiding the airplanes themselves.154 It was not until February 1994 that 
NATO finally shot down a Serbian plane violating the no fly zone.155 
Fortunately for the Libyan people, the Security Council reacted 
within one month of attacks on civilians to authorize all necessary measures 
to enforce a no fly zone and NATO actually implemented this mandate to its 
fullest. NATO aggressively enforced the no fly zone under Resolution 1973 
by destroying the Gadhafi regime’s flight capabilities and by ensuring that 
no flights from either side of the conflict were allowed in the air. Enforce-
ment of the no fly zone required a wide range of NATO personnel and re-
sources, including surveillance, intelligence, and tactical aircraft.156 NATO 
fulfilled its mandate by bombing anti-aircraft facilities, early warning radar, 
helicopters, anti-aircraft guns, and surface to air missiles launchers.157 In 
fact, the no fly zone has been implemented so aggressively that during the 
one reported challenge to the no fly zone, a French fighter jet chased a 
Gadhafi regime plane to the ground, and then destroyed it in an air-to-
ground strike as soon as it landed.158  
IV. CONCLUSION 
For two decades, humanitarian intervention had been handicapped 
by narrow legal mandates and weak implementation. But on March 17, 
2011, the international community experienced a brief moment of legal and 
  
151 S.C. Res. 816, supra note 150, ¶ 4. 
152 U.N. Department of Public Information, The United Nations and the Situation in the 
Former Yugoslavia (Sept. 1993), http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unprof_b.htm.  
153 BALKAN WATCH, supra note 74. 
154 BALKAN WATCH, supra note 23. 
155 DAVID OWEN, BALKAN ODYSSEY 355 (1995).  
156 No-Fly Zones Explained, NATO (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive 
/news_71959.htm. 
157 See Rogers, supra note 3 (dissecting the NATO bombing targets, and providing up-to-
date details on NATO campaign in Libya, including by type of action and region affected).  
158 Libya: France Jet Destroys Pro-Gaddafi Plane, BBC NEWS (Mar. 24, 2011), http:// 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12850975. 
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moral clarity, and seized this moment to stop an impending massacre. The 
Security Council provided a well-drafted legal blueprint that authorized all 
measures necessary to protect civilians, and an international coalition im-
mediately and aggressively implemented this mandate. This article does not 
take the view that humanitarian intervention is always the appropriate 
course of action. However, the next time the world does have the moral 
clarity and political will for humanitarian intervention, Resolution 1973 and 
its implementation will provide an effective blueprint for the successful 
protection of civilians.  
